The book-to-market ratio (B/M) differs across stocks because of differences in expected cashflows and expected stock returns. Our hypothesis is that the evolution of B/M, in terms of past changes in price and book equity, contains information about expected cashflows that can be used to improve estimates of expected returns. For All but Tiny stocks, the evidence favors this prediction during 1927-1963, but not 1963-2005. For Tiny stocks, there is support for the prediction throughout the sample period. Stock issues and repurchases are also related to expected cashflows, so they can help improve estimates of expected returns. This prediction gets strong support during 1963-2005, but not 1927-1962. * Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago (Fama) and Amos Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College (French). The comments of seminar participants at MIT, Indiana University, the University of Utah, and New York University, Campbell Harvey, and the referees are gratefully acknowledged.
Firms with higher ratios of the book value of common stock to its market value have higher average stock returns (Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein 1985, Fama and French 1992, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1994). The book-to-market ratio, B/M, is, however, likely to be a noisy measure of expected returns because it also varies with expected cashflows (dividends). Vuolteenaho (2002) finds that differences in forecasts of cashflows loom large in the cross-section of B/M for individual stocks.
To absorb dispersion in the cross-section of B/M due to expected cashflows, Fama and French We take a different approach here. We ask whether the evolution of B/M itself, in terms of past changes in book equity and price, contains independent information about expected cashflows that can enhance estimates of expected returns.
By way of motivation, the log of the time t book-to-market ratio, BM t , is the log of the ratio at t-k, BM t-k , plus the difference between the change in the log of book equity from t-k to t, dB t-k,t , and the change in the log of price, dM t-k,t , , , t tk tk t tk t
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Our hypothesis is that the past changes in price and book equity in (1) contain information about expected cashflows and expected returns that can improve estimates of expected returns. The past and expected future economic outcomes that differentiate high book-to-market value stocks from low BM t growth stocks are summarized in dB t-k,t and dM t-k,t . Growth in book equity, dB t-k,t , tends to be high for growth stocks and low to negative for value stocks, the result of high earnings and reinvestment by growth stocks and low earnings and reinvestment by value stocks (Fama and French 1995) . This pattern in fundamentals persists in years after t. The change in price, dM t-k,t , summarizes changes from t-k to t in expected future returns and expected cashflows, and dM t-k,t is high for growth stocks and low for value stocks. In short, using BM t alone to forecast returns may bury independent information in its components about expected cashflows and expected returns. There is thus reason to expect that we can improve forecasts of expected returns by replacing BM t with the three components in (1).
We proceed as follows. Section I further motivates the tests and presents the specifics of the (cross-section regression) approach. Section II discusses the results for All but Tiny (ABT) stocks, that is, NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks above the 20 th percentile of market capitalization (market cap, price times shares outstanding) for NYSE stocks. The ABT tests for 1927-1963 support our prediction that jointly using the components of BM t to predict returns provides better estimates of expected returns than BM t alone. The ABT tests for 1963-2005 do not, however, confirm this prediction. Thus, for ABT stocks the breakdown of BM t in (1) seems to produce independent information about expected cashflows that enhances estimates of expected returns for 1927-1963, but not thereafter.
Section III presents the results for Tiny stocks (below the 20 th percentile of NYSE market cap).
In contrast to ABT stocks, the evidence for Tiny stocks suggests that forecasting returns with the components of BM t enhances explanatory power during 1963-2005 and 1927-1963 . The marginal explanatory power seems to come mostly from lagged changes in price. Thus, for Tiny stocks the breakdown of BM t into its components seems to capture information about expected cashflows that enhances estimates of expected returns throughout the sample period.
Our tests of the information in the components of the book-to-market ratio are similar to those of Daniel and Titman (2006), but their inferences are different. Based on tests for 1968-2003 and a sample of stocks like our ABT sample, they conclude that changes in BM t due to changes in book equity (what they call tangible information) do not predict returns, but changes in price unrelated to changes in book equity (what they call intangible information) have marginal forecast power. This seems in conflict with our evidence that for ABT stocks and the 1963-2005 period, only BM t matters; that is, the breakdown of BM t into its components does not improve estimates of expected returns. We argue (Section IV) that their results are consistent with ours. Specifically, with their definitions of tangible and intangible information, all variation through time in BM t is from intangible information. Thus, their conclusion that only intangible information matters is equivalent to our (simpler) conclusion that for ABT stocks and the 1963-2005 period, breaking BM t into its components adds nothing to estimates of expected returns.
To examine how the book-to-market ratio evolves via changes in market and book values, either total or per share changes can be used. Total changes include net share issues (issues minus repurchases).
Firms that issue stock tend to have large (past and future) investments relative to earnings, while the opposite is true for firms that repurchase (Fama and French 2005) . Net share issues are thus a candidate to help isolate information about expected cashflows to better estimate expected returns. To disentangle the effects of net share issues from the effects of per share changes in market and book values, we include net share issues as a separate explanatory variable for returns. The results are discussed in Section V. Section VI concludes, with emphasis on the interpretation of the results.
Existing work documents negative abnormal returns after stock issues (Loughran and
Ritter
I. Motivation and Methods
Leaning on the framework of Fama and French (2006), this section begins by expanding the motivation for the tests, introduced above. We then discuss the cross-section regression setup that produces the empirical evidence of later sections.
A. Motivation
In the dividend discount valuation model, the market value of a share of a firm's stock is the present value of expected dividends per share,
where M t is the price at time t, E(D t+τ ) is the expected dividend for t+τ, and r is (approximately) the longterm average expected stock return or, more precisely, the internal rate of return on expected dividends. 
or, dividing by time t book equity,
Equation (4) says that, controlling for expected equity cashflows (earnings minus changes in book equity, measured relative to current book equity), a higher book-to-market equity ratio, B t /M t , implies a higher expected stock return, r. This is the motivation for using the book-to-market ratio as a proxy for expected returns. It is clear from (4), however, that dispersion across stocks in expected cashflows can act like noise that clouds the information in B t /M t about the cross-section of expected stock returns. Thus, using variables in addition to B t /M t to predict returns will improve estimates of expected returns if the additional variables help disentangle information about expected cashflows and expected returns. We argue that the evolution of the book-to-market ratio itself provides interesting candidates.
Recalling equation (1), the log of the book-to-market ratio at time t, BM t , is the log ratio at t-k, BM t-k , plus the difference between the change in the log of book equity, dB t-k,t , and the change in the log of price, dM t-k,t . The lagged growth in book equity, dB t-k,t , is related to past and expected future cashflows.
Past growth in book equity tends to be high for growth (low BM t ) stocks and low to negative for value high BM t ) stocks, the result of high earnings and reinvestment for growth stocks and low earnings and reinvestment for value stocks (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1994, Fama and French 1995). This behavior of fundamentals tends to persist in years after t, making dB t-k,t an interesting proxy for expected cashflows. Likewise, the logic of the dividend discount equation (2) is that the lagged change in price, dM t-k,t , summarizes changes from t-k to t in expected future returns and expected cashflows.
The interplay between dB t-k,t and dM t-k,t is also important in explaining how stocks migrate between value and growth. Stocks typically move to high expected return value portfolios as a result of poor past profitability and low (often negative) growth in book equity accompanied by even sharper declines in stock prices (Fama and French 1995). Conversely, stocks that move to lower expected return growth portfolios typically have high past profitability and growth in book equity along with even sharper past increases in stock prices.
In short, using BM t alone to forecast returns may bury independent information in its components about expected cashflows and expected returns. There is thus reason to expect that using the components of BM t in (1) to predict returns provides better estimates of expected returns.
An extension of this logic suggests that more distant changes in book equity and price have less information about expected cashflows and returns than more recent changes; that is, old news is less relevant than new news. A simple way to test this prediction is to examine the forecasts of returns provided by the components of BM t in (1) for different lags k. If old news is less relevant, the slopes in regressions of returns on the components of BM t should decay as the lag k for changes in price and book equity is increased. Moreover, the slope for the lagged book-to-market ratio BM t-k (which summarizes the history of growth in book equity and price preceding dB t-k,t and dM t-k,t ) should be weaker than the slopes for one or both of dB t-k,t and dM t-k,t .
The book-to-market ratio is the same whether we use price and book equity per share or total market cap and total book equity. Finally, it is worth emphasizing that in the framework of the valuation equation (4), the crosssection of BM t is determined entirely by differences across stocks in expected cashflows and expected returns. Thus, when we later infer that a variable helps forecast returns because it helps disentangle expected cashflows and expected returns, we are not talking loosely, even though we do not present direct evidence about how the marginal information splits between expected cashflows and returns.
B. Regression Setup
Fama and French (1992) use cross-section regressions of individual stock returns on market cap and the book-to-market ratio to identify differences in average returns related to the size and value-growth characteristics of firms. Here we test whether the origins of the book-to-market ratio, in terms of past changes in price versus changes in book equity, can be used, along with net share issues, to improve estimates of expected returns. In the tradition of Fama and MacBeth (1973), our tests center on the average slopes from monthly cross-section regressions of stock returns on five variables, 0 We estimate regressions (5) and (6) Amex and Nasdaq stocks are mostly Tiny. In the estimates of (5) and (6) that use one-year (k = 12) versions of dM t-k,t and dB t-k,t , the All but Tiny (ABT) sample on average has 1274 stocks during July We have also examined regressions that break the ABT sample between Big stocks (market cap above the 50 th NYSE percentile) and Small stocks (market cap between the 20 th and 50 th NYSE percentiles). Skipping the details, we can report that the average slopes in (5) and (6) are similar for Big and Small stocks. Several readers have suggested that we split ABT stocks into even finer groups, such as the top four NYSE market cap quintiles. The problem here is small sample sizes that would destroy any power to identify differences in average slopes across size quintiles. Moreover, the fact that average regression slopes are similar for Big and Small stocks, but different for Tiny stocks, suggests that the split of stocks into the ABT and Tiny samples captures the main differences in results for size groups.
Finally, the results for net share issues in the estimates of (5) and (6) are interesting, but we do not comment on them until Section V, where they are examined in detail.
C. Baseline Regressions
As a baseline for the estimates of regressions (5) and (6), Table 1 Also as in earlier work, Table 1 shows that ABT stocks with lower market cap have higher average returns. The negative average MC t slopes for the subperiods are close to (within 0.01 of) the fullperiod slope (-0.07), but it takes the power of the full sample period to push the t-statistic for the average MC t slope close to -2.0. The full regressions (5) and (6), with their enhanced explanatory power, will typically produce more reliable evidence of a size effect in ABT average returns.
A striking result in Table 1 is that the size effect is stronger among Tiny stocks. The negative average slopes for MC t in the regressions for Tiny stocks are more than six times those from the ABT sample. The MC t slopes for Tiny stocks in Table 1 are more than three standard errors from zero, and they are strong in the full regressions (5) and (6), presented later. The positive relation between average return and BM t is also somewhat stronger for Tiny stocks than for ABT stocks when only MC t and BM t are used to predict returns, but this will not be true in the full regressions (5) and (6).
II. Regressions (5) and (6) for ABT Stocks
Part A of Table 2 summarizes estimates of regression (5) In sum, the estimates of (5) and (6) 
III. Regressions (5) and (6) for Tiny Stocks
The results for Tiny stocks from regressions (5) and (6), in Table 3 , differ from those for ABT stocks in Table 2 Table 3 ). This leads to the inference of Daniel and Titman (2006) that tangible information that arises between t-k and t is irrelevant for future expected returns.
In our terms, there is a simpler interpretation of the regression that substitutes I t-k,t for dM t-k,t in (5). From equation (1) and the definition of intangible information as I t-k,t = dM t-k,t -dB t-k,t , the change in
the book-to-market ratio from t-k to t is,
In words, the book-to-market ratio changes only because of intangible information, the excess of the change in price over the change in book equity. Thus, the conclusion that expected returns change only because of intangible information is equivalent to our more direct conclusion that for ABT stocks and the 1963-2006 period, only the current book to market ratio counts; the origins of BM t in terms of past changes in book equity and past changes in price do not enhance estimates of expected returns.
There is another way to see the point. Suppose we substitute I t-k,t for dM t-k,t in regression (6). The regression then provides a direct test of whether the tangible and intangible information that arise from t-k to t add to the estimates of expected returns provided by the most recent book-to-market ratio, BM t .
There is, however, no need to run this regression. The average slopes for dM t-k,t and dB t-k,t are close to zero in the 1963-2006 estimates of (6) for ABT stocks (Table 2) , so the slope for I t-k,t = dM t-k,t -dB t-k,t must be close to zero. In short, the simple story told by the 1963-2006 estimates of regressions (5) and (6) for ABT stocks (that breaking BM t into its components seems to add nothing to estimates of expected returns) can be obscured by linear transformations of the variables, but it cannot be changed.
V. Share Issues and Repurchases
Earlier studies typically identify stock issues and repurchases via public announcements. With this approach, many events are missed and sample periods are limited. Like Daniel and Titman (2006) and Pontiff and Woodgate (2006), we measure net share issues via CRSP, using the change over k months in split-adjusted shares outstanding, NS t-k,t (k = 12, 36, 60), which is negative when firms on balance repurchase during the k-month period and positive when on balance they issue. This approach allows us to cover all issues and repurchases, including those not publicized. It also allows us to examine the relation between average returns and net issues for 1927-1963 as well as for 1963-2006.
Before examining the results for net share issues, it is worth emphasizing that, like other variables in regressions (5) and (6), NS t-k,t is measured long before the returns it is used to explain. Specifically, NS t-k,t is the change in shares outstanding for the k months ending in December of year t-1, so the last month of share changes in NS t-k,t is at least six months before the monthly returns NS t-k,t is used to explain (July of t through June of t+1). Thus, pure announcement effects associated with net share issues should have played out when we use NS t-k,t to predict returns, and any forecast power can be attributed to longerterm information about expected returns. The 1927-1963 results for net share issues are so contrary to the results for later periods that have so stirred the literature, they warrant further study. We first examine how the cross-section of net issues changes through time, for clues as to why predictions of returns from net issues might change. We then use a portfolio approach to provide a more direct perspective on stock returns after net issues. programs that, on a year-to-year basis, involve rather small fractions of shares outstanding. Such benefit programs are rare during the early years of the sample. Stock issues via seasoned equity offerings (SEOs)
A. The Cross-Section of Net Share Issues
or as payment in mergers tend to be larger. They are relatively infrequent throughout the sample period, but they are a larger fraction of issue events earlier in the period.
The differences between the ABT cross-sections of share issues for early and later years of the sample shrink when we expand the interval for measuring issues from one to five years. In fact, the average quintile breakpoints for five-year issues ( Why do the cross-sections of issues for early and later years converge when we extend the issuing interval from one to five years? Later in the sample, many firms make relatively small issues of stock, primarily in employee compensation plans (Fama and French 2006) . Except at the high end, these small issues dominate the cross-section of one-year issues. Over five-year intervals, however, firms are more likely to engage in one or more large issues (SEOs and stock financed mergers). These large events play a big role in the entire cross-section of five-year issues. As a result, the distribution of five-year issues for later years looks much like that of earlier years, where large issues always dominate the cross-section.
Repurchases are more frequent after 1982, and they increase in size. In the ten-year periods before 1983, the median repurchase of ABT firms that retire shares in any given year averages less than The problem with this story is that there are plenty of large net stock issues throughout the sample period, and it is difficult to explain why large issues add nothing to the explanation of ABT expected returns during the early years of the sample period but (as we see next) they play a big role later on. and BM t to predict returns. Table 5 allows us to examine how average returns vary with NS t-k,t after adjusting for market cap and book-to-market effects. We call these adjusted average returns abnormal returns. To have comparable results for ABT and Tiny stocks, the breakpoints for NS t-k,t in Table 5 are those for ABT stocks summarized in Table 4 .
B. The Cross-Section of Average Returns
The portfolio results in Table 5 confirm the regressions in Tables 2 and 3 Table 2 , the sorts for 1927-1963 in Table 5 fail to produce the negative relation between ABT average returns and net share issues observed in existing papers that focus on the subsequent period.
For Tiny stocks, there are no patterns in 1927-1963 abnormal returns after repurchases or issues (Table 5) . Thus, the fact that the 1927-1963 average NS t-k,t slopes for Tiny stocks in the regressions (Table 3) are negative is apparently less important than the fact that they are statistically unreliable. In any case, like the sorts for ABT stocks, the 1927-1963 NS t-k,t sorts for Tiny stocks fail to produce the negative relation between average returns and net share issues observed in the subsequent period.
Like the regressions, the NS t-k,t sorts for 1963-2006 produce strong evidence that net share issues predict returns. For ABT stocks, the action in the 1963-2006 returns from the sorts is in the extremes of net issues. The abnormal return for the extreme 50% of repurchases of the preceding year is 0.25% per month (t = 4.66), the abnormal return for the extreme 20% of last year's issues is -0.41% per month (t = -5.57), and abnormal returns outside the extremes are much closer to zero (Table 5) . These results are not surprising since much of the action in NS t-k,t itself during 1963-2006 is in the extremes (Table 4 ).
Earlier studies find that the negative abnormal returns following stock issues and the positive abnormal returns following repurchases persist for years. Like the regressions (Table 2) , the sorts of ABT abnormal returns for 1963-2006 (Table 5 ) support this conclusion. The extreme 50% of repurchases of the last five years are good news for ABT monthly returns (the abnormal return is more than four standard errors above zero), and returns following these large repurchases do not decline as the repurchase horizon is extended from one to five years. Abnormal returns after stock issues fall a bit when the issuing horizon is extended beyond a year, but the extreme 20% of the issues of the last one, three, and five years are nevertheless bad news for ABT returns (abnormal returns more than -4.5 standard errors from zero).
The 1963-2006 abnormal returns for Tiny firms that issue stock (NS t-k,t > 0) are similar to the ABT results. Again, we observe strong negative abnormal returns for the largest quintile of issues. And the abnormal returns of Tiny firms that issue do not change a lot as the horizon for issues is extended from one to five years. The 1963-2006 results for repurchases are, however, different for Tiny stocks. In particular, the strong positive abnormal returns observed in the year after extreme repurchases by Tiny firms disappear for repurchases over the last three or five years. This is in contrast to the persistence of repurchase returns for ABT stocks.
Finally, we caution against reading too much into the full cross-section of abnormal returns in Table 5 . The abnormal returns are averages across months of regression residuals that average to zero every month. Thus, large abnormal returns in the extremes must be absorbed by the remaining cells in the sorts. Patterns in the way abnormal returns vary across the cells of the sorts are, however, meaningful.
For example, the decline in 1963-2006 ABT abnormal returns across the sort cells from extreme repurchases to extreme issues is meaningful (and consistent with the negative average regression slopes for NS t-k,t in Table 2 ), but the fact that the average residuals for less extreme issues are mostly positive is probably misleading. There is, however, nothing mechanical in the finding that abnormal returns for 1927-1963 bounce about rather randomly across the cells of the NS t-k,t sorts (which is consistent with the weak average regression slopes for NS t-k,t observed for this period in Tables 2 and 3 ).
VI. Conclusions
We examine whether the origins of the book-to-market ratio, BM t , in terms of past changes in price and book equity, dM t-k,t and dB t-k,t , and the more distant changes in price and book equity summarized by BM t-k , can be used to provide better estimates of expected returns than BM t alone. Our hypothesis is that past changes in price and book equity help disentangle the information in BM t about expected cashflows and expected returns, to enhance estimates of expected returns.
The tests for 1963-2006 on All but Tiny stocks produce little evidence in favor of our hypothesis.
During 1963-2006, using the components of BM t (that is, dM t-k,t , dB t-k,t , and BM t-k ) to predict ABT returns provides estimates of expected returns that are not reliably better than the estimates from BM t alone. In the valuation framework of equation (4) (when splitting BM t into its components enhances estimates of expected returns). June 1963 June (1927 June -1963 , and July 1963 to December 2006 December (1963 December -2006 . Stocks is the average number of stocks in the regressions. MC t is the natural log of market cap (price times shares outstanding) at the end of June, and BM t is the log of the ratio of book and market equity per share. Book equity in BM t is for the fiscal year ending in the preceding calendar year, and market equity is for the end of December of the preceding calendar year. The monthly regressions for July of year t to June of t+1 include NYSE, Amex (after 1962), and Nasdaq (after 1972) stocks with positive book equity for the fiscal yearend in the preceding calendar year, t-1. Book equity for 1962 to 2006 is Compustat's total assets (data item 6), minus liabilities (181), plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (35) The residuals from the monthly regressions of stock returns on market cap (MC t ) and the book-to-market ratio (BM t ) in Table 1 are sorted on net share issues (NS t-k,t ) and grouped using the intervals of NS t-k,t for All but Tiny stocks summarized in Table 4 . The table shows the regression residuals averaged first within the cells of the sort for a month and then across months in a period. The t-statistics for the average residuals are also shown. Firms that repurchase are sorted into two groups, those below (<-50%) and above (-50%) the median for firms with NS t-k,t < 0. 
